Europe’s Scale-Up Funding Gap: Six Constraints on Venture Capital Supply and a Reform Agenda

The European Union faces a paradox that threatens its future: it excels at creating world-class research but struggles to transform it into successful economic growth. Recent policy debates, most prominently the Draghi (2025) report, have therefore placed Europe’s ability to scale innovative firms at the centre of the EU’s competitiveness agenda. Europe’s innovation dilemma exemplifies what scholars term the “European paradox”: the EU produces fundamental research output comparable to that of its main international competitors, yet significantly lags behind in transforming research excellence into commercial innovations and competitive advantage (Argyropoulou et al., 2019). Beyond the start-up stage, European scale-ups are consistently underfunded due to structural capital constraints, resulting in EU scale-ups raising 50% less capital than their US counterparts over their first decade of operation (European Investment Bank, 2024). This raises a fundamental question: why does a persistent investment gap exist for scale-ups in the EU compared to its competitors, and what actions can be taken to close it? We argue that the gap is fundamentally driven by supply-side constraints in venture capital (VC) availability.

The stage-specific funding gap

The innovation funding journey follows a pattern, as illustrated in Figure 1, from an idea to fundamental research and development, through startup formation, to eventual commercialisation and market expansion. At each stage, companies require different types and amounts of capital. Initially, modest seed funding is required to support the proof of concept, enabling companies to validate their products and achieve initial market entry. Later, substantial growth capital is required for commercialisation and expansion at scale. The so-called Valley of Death (VoD), the funding gap when companies struggle to secure sufficient growth capital, emerges during the proof-of-concept phase and can persist until full profitability (Gbadegeshin et al., 2022). During this phase, innovative firms run out of R&D funding but are not yet generating sufficient revenue to be profitable or attractive to debt financing (Natsheh et al., 2021).

Figure 1
The Valley of Death in the innovation funding journey

This growth capital, typically needed after the proof-of-concept phase, is often provided by VC. It is a form of private equity financing that invests in high-potential growth companies in exchange for equity stakes, offering not only growth funding but also strategic guidance during the critical stage when companies are competing to establish themselves at scale in the market (Gompers & Lerner, 2001). According to Budi and Aldianto (2020) as well as Helman (2022), insufficient VC availability is the primary driver of innovative firms becoming trapped in the VoD, representing a critical bottleneck in Europe’s innovation ecosystem. The extent of the VC funding gap faced by the EU becomes clear when compared with its main competitor, the United States. In 2021, at the height of the post-pandemic investment boom, US VC transactions reached US $405.4 billion, more than five times the US $72.8 billion VC investments recorded in the EU (Dealroom, 2025). Since then, both markets have cooled down significantly, but the structural asymmetry has, if anything, intensified. By 2025, US investment had recovered to US $283.3 billion, while volume in the EU stagnated at US $39.1 billion.

A closer examination of VC investments by stage reveals a more nuanced picture (see Figure 2). In 2025, pre-seed and seed investments in the EU amounted to approximately US $3 billion, compared to US $2.7 billion in the United States, indicating no meaningful deficit in seed venture activity for the EU. However, the discrepancy is particularly evident where VoD is most apparent – in the early- and growth-stage phases, once start-ups move beyond seed funding. The United States accounted for US $115 billion in venture investments across early- and growth-stage rounds in 2025, while the EU recorded only US $28 billion in transaction volume, a gap of US $87 billion. This imbalance between funding rounds becomes even more apparent when adjusted for population size, as shown in Figure 3. At each funding stage, the disparities between the EU and the US become larger, and for late stage and exit rounds the difference is 26-fold.

Figure 2
Venture capital deals by stage

in billion US dollars

These patterns suggest that European start-ups face no significant funding disadvantage when launching their businesses, but rather after the seed funding when scaling their operations. Far greater sums are invested in US growth- and late-stage rounds, whereas European venture activity remains concentrated at the seed stage. In addition, European scale-ups also receive less support from domestic capital than their US counterparts. For example, while 76% of early-stage VC financing in the US comes from domestic investors, the figure in Europe is only 55%. The difference widens even further in the later stages: in the US, 81% of late-stage VC financing comes from domestic sources, while in Europe, only 30% comes from local investors (Dealroom, 2025).

Why the gap persists: Six supply-side constraints

We argue that the funding gap is fundamentally driven by supply-side constraints in VC availability. While demand-side constraints, such as entrepreneurial risk aversion and a weak commercialisation environment, are recognised as relevant factors, it is critical to recognise that even a fully optimised demand side cannot attract VC that does not exist.

Examining dry powder, i.e. uninvested VC available for deployment, reveals the stark disparity in available growth capital between the United States and the EU. US VC firms held US $307 billion in dry powder in 2024, compared to Europe’s US $62 billion dry powder (Invest Europe, 2024; NVCA, 2025). On a per capita basis, this translates to approximately US $887 available per American versus US $138 per European, a more than 6:1 disadvantage for European entrepreneurs seeking growth capital.

This gap is not the product of a single policy failure, but rather the outcome of several constraints, which can be organised into two distinct categories. First, structural constraints that reduce the pool of capital available for venture investments, including pension system architecture, the absence of large endowments and foundations, and a bank-dominated financial system. Second, disincentive constraints that discourage existing capital from flowing into VC, even when it is available, due to regulatory capital charges for institutional investors, capital market fragmentation within the EU and a weak exit environment. Together, these six constraints discussed in more detail below are the key factors that systematically limit European VC supply.

Structural constraints: An insufficient capital pool

Examining how VC funds are financed across different investor types reveals structural deficits in the European capital pool for possible VC investments. Figure 4 breaks down VC funding sources by investor type. In the US, VC funds primarily raise capital from pension funds, endowments and foundations. These funding sources, which account for almost 60% of VC funding in the US, are significantly underrepresented in the EU, where they make up only 13%. By contrast, the VC landscape in the EU relies heavily on financial intermediaries, such as banks, insurance companies and investment firms, reflecting a bank-dominated financial system.

Figure 4
Venture capital funding sources by investor type, averaged over 2019-2023

The first structural driver is the different role of the pension system architecture. In the US, VC is drawn heavily from pension funds (30.7%) while in the EU, pension funds (7.6%) play a much smaller role as a funding source for VC. This shortage of pension assets represents a deeply structural constraint on EU VC availability. European pension systems rely heavily on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) structures for their primary pension pillars. In contrast, the US pension system relies primarily on funded individual accounts and collective pension funds that accumulate and invest assets over time, creating vast capital reserves available for investments. These funded pension systems serve as major capital sources for US VC.

Second, the near absence of endowments and foundations as VC investors represents another major gap. As shown in Figure 4, endowments and foundations account for 27.8% of VC funding in the US compared to 5.5% in the EU.

The third structural constraint arises from the way European financial markets are organised. In the EU, the major source of VC originates from financial intermediaries (41.3%), such as insurance, banks and other investment firms, compared to only 10.8% in the US. This reflects Europe’s bank-dominated financial system, in which capital allocation primarily occurs through intermediaries, adding a layer of risk-averse institutions compared to the US. Such a bank-dominated system reinforces conservative investment patterns and leaves little room for allocations to higher-risk investments such as VC (Saillard & Url, 2011). Conversely, the United States relies far more on a market-based system, supporting risk pooling that allows investors to allocate risk more easily.

Disincentive constraints: Capital that does not flow to venture capital

Beyond the mentioned structural constraints that limit the available European capital pool, the dominance of financial intermediaries in the European VC ecosystem creates additional barriers. Capital that could otherwise be deployed in VC is further discouraged by regulatory capital charges as well as tax and legal fragmentation across the EU member states. Additionally, a bank-dominated system limits exit opportunities through weak initial public offering (IPOs) and acquisitions, thereby lowering expected returns in the European VC market and further disincentivising investment. Three aspects are crucial.

First, regulatory capital charges, such as Solvency II and Basel III serve legitimate objectives to protect financial stability. However, these regulations have unintended consequences as they restrict banks and insurance companies from investing in VC (Laas & Siegel, 2017). Under Solvency II and Basel III, insurance companies and banks are required to reserve a specified amount of capital for each VC investment. These capital charges imposed in the EU for VC investments are comparatively high relative to other investment classes (Arnold et al., 2024), thus increasing the cost of VC investments.

Next, the tax and legal fragmentation across the 27 member states further increases the cost of investment and thus the incentive to invest in the European VC market. Cross-border VC investments within the EU trigger withholding taxes that investors can theoretically reclaim, but the reclaim procedures differ across the 27 member states and can take over 12 months, tying up capital for months and increasing investment cost. The European Commission (2023) estimates that withholding refund procedures cost investors €6.62 billion per year. Besides tax fragmentation, the EU, unlike the United States, also suffers from fragmented laws between member states.

Lastly, the Capital Markets Union (CMU) initiative, launched in 2015, has yet to resolve capital market fragmentation, which continues to produce a weak exit environment. With liquidity spread across multiple national exchanges and listing requirements varying across EU member states, European public markets lack the size to support high-valuation exits for VC-backed mature companies. Dealroom (2025) estimates that total VC-backed IPOs in the EU amounted to US $18.6 billion in 2025, compared to US $178.9 billion in the United States.

Together, the structural and disincentive constraints form a reinforcing system that limits VC supply, explaining the funding gap from a supply-side view. These constraints are deeply embedded in Europe’s institutional landscape and will not self-correct through market forces alone. This raises a critical question for European policymakers: are the policy responses deployed so far sufficient to address them?

EU policy responses and their limits

EU institutions have not been passive in deploying meaningful policy responses to close the European VC funding gap. Yet these initiatives fall short of fully addressing the disincentives and structural constraints.

Beginning with disincentive constraints, these represent the low-hanging fruit from a policy perspective, and considerably more progress has been made here than on the structural side. The revised ELTIF 2.0 Regulation, an EU framework allowing private market funds such as VC to be sold to retail investors, broadened the definition of eligible assets and removed minimum investment thresholds, ^{easing the path for private capital to flow into European VC. Together with AIFMD II, which aims to harmonise fund manager rules across member states, these policies represent meaningful steps towards a less fragmented regulatory environment. Nevertheless, both frameworks still leave room for national divergence, particularly in tax treatment, maintaining legal fragmentation across EU member states. The Faster and Safer Relief of Excess Withholding Taxes (FASTER) Directive, which targets the cost of withholding tax refund procedures, is a further welcome step. Yet it is not scheduled for implementation until 2030. The 2023 Solvency II revision addresses the regulatory capital constraints faced by European insurers by introducing the Long-Term Equity Investment (LTEI) category, which reduces capital charges on qualifying equity holdings from 49% to 22%. This is a further meaningful step, as it recognises that long-term VC investments should not be treated as risky short-term equity positions. However, the practical effect of the reform has not yet fully materialised. Delayed transposition into national law and complex eligibility criteria, combined with deep-seated insurer preferences for bond investments, mean that few insurers have increased their VC allocations as a result (Invest Europe, 2024).}

Regarding capital market fragmentation, the EU has taken incremental steps towards a Capital Markets Union to improve the exit environment for VC investments, like the EU Listing Act, ^{which reduces the cost of going public by simplifying prospectus requirements and reporting obligations for companies listed across multiple EU stock exchanges. Similarly, the Commission’s Market Integration Package targets trade barriers, such as cross-border clearing and settlement fragmentation, aiming to further harmonise cross-border trading. Yet, these initiatives reduce administrative barriers without addressing the fundamental problem of having too many small exchanges with separate pools of capital. In this sense, the CMU remains a regulatory harmonisation project rather than a structural transformation programme. Achieving truly integrated capital markets through consolidated stock exchanges and a unified investment law framework would also address structural constraints on Europe’s VC supply by shifting the European financing system from a bank-based to a market-based model.}

As discussed above, pension funds and foundations and endowments account for almost 60% of US VC funding yet remain largely absent as VC sources in the EU. In the absence of such large institutional capital pools, the EU has increasingly turned to public co-investment in recent years, seeking to substitute for the capital sources that drive US venture markets. Programmes such as the European Innovation Council’s Accelerator invest public capital into European start-ups at seed and early stage, thereby mobilising private VC funding that might otherwise not flow into European start-ups. According to the EIC, the Accelerator Programme has so far signed investments of more than €1.4 billion under Horizon Europe (2021-2027), having mobilised private capital with a leverage of 3.5 (European Commission, 2026a), suggesting that approximately €5 billion in additional VC flow into Europe’s seed- and early-stage start-ups over the programme’s lifetime.

While this represents a meaningful step towards closing the funding gap through public co-investment, the most significant shortfall in EU VC occurs not at seed and early stages but at the growth and late stages. Also, the EU has not been passive in addressing the gap here, most notably through the European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI), a fund-of-funds that has committed more than €3.9 billion to European VC and PE funds since 2023 (EIB Group, 2026), thereby channelling public capital to growth- and late-stage funds rather than directly investing into companies. Beyond the fund-of-funds ETCI, the European Commission (2026b) has recently announced a new Scaleup Europe Fund that aims at providing several billion euros in additional investment in European growth- and late-stage scale-ups.

Taken together, these instruments represent a welcome step in the EU’s efforts to address the VC funding gap through public co-investment. Yet their combined scale remains far short of what is required.

Policy pathways

The constraints fall into two categories, and so must the policy response. Disincentive constraints that discourage existing capital from flowing into VC can be addressed through near-term regulatory reform. Structural constraints that limit the total capital pool available require longer-term structural transformation. Both reform horizons are complementary: removing disincentives alone merely optimises a capital pool that remains too small, while expanding the pool without addressing disincentives will not ensure that new capital reaches EU venture markets. We outline three policy recommendations, beginning with the near-term reforms where progress can be most immediate: EU Inc. and a redesign of the Scaleup Europe Fund as near-term regulatory reforms, as well as a European Supplementary Pension as a long-term structural transformation.

EU Inc.

Existing EU policies reveal a recurring pattern: while the EU has deployed meaningful initiatives to address the disincentive constraints, these efforts consistently fall short because they harmonise around 27 national systems rather than replacing fragmentation at its source. In this sense, the EU is fixing the symptoms but not the disease. The 28th regime, an EU-level corporate form (EU Inc) operating alongside national frameworks, as recommended by the Draghi (2025) report, offers a fundamentally different approach: rather than harmonising 27 national systems, it bypasses fragmentation at the level of the company itself. A fully realised EU Inc. would directly address several of the disincentive constraints simultaneously.

First, it would eliminate legal fragmentation for VC investors. A single EU-wide company form means a single governance framework, a single set of investor protections, and a single risk model applicable across all member states, functioning, in effect, as a European equivalent of the successful US Delaware jurisdiction. Investors would no longer need to hire legal counsel in each jurisdiction, run separate due diligence, or price legal risk differently for each investment. Second, by creating a standardised legal corporate form that is equally legible to investors across member states, the EU Inc. removes a key constraint for deeper capital market integration. A company incorporated under EU-wide rules can, in principle, list on any European exchange without adapting to local company law, thereby reducing one of the barriers that currently fragment European exit markets and depress expected VC returns. Third, and more indirectly, a functioning EU Inc. with viable cross-border exit channels would generate spillover effects, gradually attracting more direct institutional capital into European equity markets and reducing dependence on bank-based finance.

Fragmentation across 27 national legal systems also explains why the reforms have so far delivered limited results. ELTIF 2.0, AIFMD II, FASTER and the Listing Act each remove one friction in the investment chain, yet continue to operate under 27 different company laws. A functioning 28th regime supplies the missing investee-side layer that turns these partial harmonisations into a coherent reform package. The Commission’s proposal for the EU Inc. Regulation of March 2026 represents a welcome step towards this logic (European Commission, 2026a). However, as Ringe (2026) and Enriques et al. (2026) argue, the proposal falls short in several critical areas. The EU Inc. Regulation does not create a fully self-contained legal regime. Article 4(2) provides that matters not covered by the EU Inc. Regulation are governed by the national law of the member state in which the EU Inc. has its registered office. In practice, as Ringe (2006) argues, this creates a German-style EU Inc. or a French-style EU Inc., rather than the single legal framework that cross-border investors require. Moreover, the proposal’s harmonised insolvency law applies only to EU Inc. companies classified as innovative start-ups, while all other companies fall back on national insolvency law. This is particularly consequential given that the most significant funding gap occurs at the growth and late stages. Finally, the proposal creates no dedicated exit pathway. Article 41 refers to EU Inc. companies seeking to restructure or relocate across borders to the same cumbersome procedures that govern traditional public companies.

For the 28th regime to close the growth-stage funding gap, the legislative process must address these shortcomings. The EU Inc. Regulation must minimise national law gap-filling to deliver the single legal framework that cross-border investors require. Harmonised insolvency rules must extend beyond start-ups to encompass scale-ups, where the funding gap is most acute. Moreover, the EU Inc. must be complemented by harmonised tax treatment and credible exit infrastructure, building on the FASTER Directive and the Listing Act discussed before, to ensure that a uniform corporate form operates within a uniform investment environment.

Scaleup Europe Fund as a regulatory gateway

The EU already deploys public co-investment through instruments such as the EIC Accelerator and the ETCI, yet their combined scale remains far short of closing the funding gap in growth and the late stage. This does not reflect a flaw in the instrument itself. Public co-investment is a well-documented mechanism for crowding in private VC, as demonstrated by Israel’s Yozma programme (Avnimelech & Teubal, 2004), and by Bpifrance (OECD, 2025). What is needed is a vehicle that applies this proven logic at the European scale, targeted precisely where the deficit is most acute. The Commission’s proposed Scaleup Europe Fund represents exactly this shift (European Commission, 2026b). Unlike the EIC Accelerator, which operates at the seed and early stages, the Fund is explicitly directed at growth- and late-stage rounds. Its co-investment structure, in which public capital invests alongside private investors rather than replacing them, preserves the crowding-in mechanism that made Yozma and Bpifrance effective. Yet the Fund’s impact will ultimately be constrained by the size of public budget allocations.

Next to public spending, such a public co-investment fund should serve as a regulatory gateway that unlocks the institutional capital currently held back by the disincentive constraints European insurers face, disproportionately high capital charges on VC holdings relative to other asset classes (Arnold et al., 2024), making VC allocations unattractive. Insurers’ long-term liability structures naturally align with the investment horizon VC requires, and their equity holdings should not be penalised to the same degree as short-term equity positions. The Scaleup Europe Fund can address this constraint by serving as the vehicle that enables the existing LTEI relief to be used. Investments routed through the Fund should be presumed LTEI-eligible under the regulations, automatically qualifying for lower capital charges without the complicated eligibility criteria that have so far deterred insurer participation.

The same logic can be extended to pension funds. National tax incentives, the conventional lever for redirecting pension capital towards VC, fall outside the EU’s competence, and enacting them uniformly across 27 member states has proven politically difficult. The Scaleup Europe Fund could offer a way around this constraint. By coupling Fund participation with an EU-backed first-loss guarantee, as deployed in the InvestEU Fund, the EU can absorb a defined share of downside risk and align the Fund’s risk-return profile with the liability-matching constraints that govern pension investment decisions. This converts the Fund into a regulated, EU-level channel through which existing pension capital can flow into growth-stage VC without relying on national tax competencies or requiring pension funds themselves to take on risk exposures that their mandates would otherwise prohibit. Together, these two mechanisms transform the Scaleup Europe Fund from a budget-constrained co-investment vehicle into a regulatory gateway that mobilises insurance and pension capital at a scale public spending alone cannot achieve.

European Supplementary Pension

The policies proposed above can reallocate existing capital towards VC, but they address only disincentive constraints, not the structural deficit of the capital pool itself. The most fundamental constraint on European VC supply is architectural: the dominance of PAYG pension systems across the EU. The result is that pension funds account for only 7.6% of European VC funding, compared to 30.7% in the US, a gap that no regulatory gateway can close if the underlying capital does not exist. Closing this structural gap requires a gradual shift towards funded supplementary pension provision at the EU level. We propose the creation of a European Supplementary Pension, a capital-building European pension pillar that operates alongside, not in place of, existing national pension systems. Unlike the Pan-European Personal Pension Product, which was conceived as a narrow Pillar III savings product and has seen negligible market uptake, the European Supplementary Pension could encompass both employer-sponsored and individual contributions, creating a single, EU-wide pool of funded pension assets that can be invested in European capital markets, including VC. Furthermore, it would provide a strong political statement towards a closer EU identity.

Such a pillar would generate a substantial EU-wide capital pool of funded pension assets invested across the European economy, including capital markets in equities, bonds and infrastructure. VC would be one component of this broader allocation, allowing European venture markets to benefit from pension capital. The long-term investment horizon of pension savings aligns well with the long lock-up periods required by VC investments, and historically, VC has delivered returns that make it a suitable element of a diversified pension portfolio.

A funded supplementary pension pillar at the EU level would thus address several of the constraints diagnosed in this article simultaneously. It generates an investable capital pool that European PAYG systems cannot provide structurally, gradually building the pension base that European venture markets currently lack. It reduces the EU’s dependence on bank-based intermediation by channelling household savings directly into capital markets, shifting the European financial system towards the market-based model. And it creates a tangible, EU-level financial entitlement for citizens, strengthening the political legitimacy of deeper capital market integration.

Conclusion

The funding gap between European and US scale-ups is neither uniform across the innovation journey nor reducible to a shortage of research, innovation and entrepreneurial ambition. European start-ups face no significant funding disadvantage at the seed stage, but the gap widens sharply once companies move into growth- and late-stage rounds. European founders can launch their businesses, but they cannot scale them in Europe. Beyond economic growth, this shortfall threatens Europe’s strategic autonomy in the technologies that will define the coming decades.

This article focused on six supply-side constraints on VC availability, organised into two categories: first, structural constraints that limit the size of the available capital pool, including the dominance of PAYG pension systems, the near-absence of endowments and foundations, and a bank-dominated financial system; and second, disincentive constraints that discourage existing capital from flowing into VC, including regulatory capital charges, tax and legal fragmentation across the 27 member states, and a weak exit environment.

Existing EU policy responses are necessary steps but insufficient. They harmonise around 27 national systems rather than replacing fragmentation at its source, and they leave the structural capital deficit largely untouched. The EU is treating symptoms rather than the causes. The policy recommendations proposed by this article are therefore best understood not as parallel options but as a sequenced reform package, each addressing a different layer of the diagnosis.

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